The Effect of the Change in Call Loan Rates and Volatility on Stock Returns in 1929: An Empirical Study into a Determinant of the Great Depression by Chitre, Amberish
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2018
The Effect of the Change in Call Loan Rates and
Volatility on Stock Returns in 1929: An Empirical
Study into a Determinant of the Great Depression
Amberish Chitre
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chitre, Amberish, "The Effect of the Change in Call Loan Rates and Volatility on Stock Returns in 1929: An Empirical Study into a
Determinant of the Great Depression" (2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1912.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1912
Claremont McKenna College 
 
The Effect of the Change in Call Loan Rates and Volatility on Stock Returns in 1929: An 
Empirical Study into a Determinant of the Great Depression 
 
 
 
 
 
submitted to  
Eric Hughson 
 
 
 
 
by 
Amberish Chitre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for  
Senior Thesis  
Spring 2018 in Financial Economics 
April 23, 2018 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Manoj and Anagha Chitre for sponsoring my education at 
Claremont McKenna College, Professor Eric Hughson, Ph.D. for his mentorship, support, 
and guidance, Professor Marc Weidenmier Ph.D. for his knowledge of the subject, and 
the Financial Economics Institute for providing me the tools and support necessary to 
write this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Literature Review 
3. Data 
4. Empirical Analysis 
5. Results 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
7. Appendix 
8. References 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Abstract 
 
I investigate the effect of the change in call loan rates on stock returns during 1929. 
Call loan rates are the interest rates on borrowed funds to trade equity on a given exchange. 
It is estimated that 40% of stocks during this period were bought on margin. After a price 
decline comes a margin call, followed by a forced sales of securities, which leads to 
additional margin calls and future price declines. I regress daily excess returns on the 
change in daily call loan rates during 1929. In addition, I estimate volatility using an ARCH 
model and observe the previously understood negative relationship between volatility and 
stock prices. I find a statistically significant negative relationship between call loan rates 
and stock returns. Furthermore, I also find that changes in call loan rates are most 
influential on the manufacturing sector relative to the other 11 industries tested.    
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1. Introduction 
A frequently debated hypothesis posits that reducing the percentage of borrowed 
funds used to finance stock positions (margin requirements). A heavily contested and 
controversial view, the use of margin requirements to control stock return volatility and 
returns has been used as the primary rationale behind the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s initial 
use of the policy. Hardouvelis (1988) sets the precedent for future debate on the subject by 
finding that historical evidence supports the proposition that margin requirements reduce 
stock return volatility. This was a widely held view prior to Hardouvelis (1988) but 
Hardouvelis gained notoriety because he was one of the first to perform an empirical test 
explaining the validity of this view.  
The majority of later papers in the subject including those of Kupiec (1989), 
Salinger (1989), and Hsieh and Miller (1990) showed through different reasoning that 
Hardouvelis (1988)’s result was erroneous because of incorrect empirical techniques. The 
most commonly cited issue was Hardouvelis (1988)’s use of a 12-month moving standard 
deviation which is only a backward looking measure, not a forward looking one. All of the 
authors adjusted their own tests by either using different measures for volatility such as the 
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) or replicating 
Hardouvelis (1988)’s study for different sample periods. All found that there is no 
meaningful relationship between margin requirements and volatility or stock returns.  
Hardouvelis (1990) accounted for this criticism by adjusting his model to use a 
different monthly measure for volatility and found the same statistically significant margin-
volatility relationship as his 1988 paper. Hsieh and Miller (1990) further criticized this 
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measure by arguing that Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) should have taken differences in 
variables, not levels. They corrected for this apparent misspecification and found no 
significant result. Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) disputed Hsieh and Miller (1990)’s 
criticism by arguing that volatility and margin requirements are stationary and thus taking 
differences in the variables is incorrect.  
In summary, the majority of the previous literature concludes that there is no 
significant relationship between changing the margin requirement and that change’s impact 
on volatility or stock returns. Although it should be noted that there is considerable 
reference to Hardouvelis’s findings and controversy over the validity of his methodology 
and results.  
This paper takes a step away from the existing debate about margin requirements 
by focusing on a variable that has been discussed in the literature but only from a theoretical 
perspective as a perceived influence on stock prices: the call loan rate. The debate on 
margin requirements and the lack of consensus in the literature is important to discuss for 
two reasons. The first is that it points to an abundance of discussion about the validity of 
an important monetary policy. The second is that the debate highlights an apparent lack of 
discussion on a highly related topic that may have an influence on stock prices. Therefore, 
the purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of this variable and empirically test 
the change in call loan rates’ effect on total stock market and industry returns.   
Margin trading plays a significant role in financial markets because it gives 
investors an ability to invest a larger amount in marginable securities than they otherwise 
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would be able to using cash.1 This is important because many investors use it to boost 
returns above and beyond what they could have done without the use of margin. 
I began my analysis by collecting daily data of call loan rates in 1929. This data 
lies in the historical section of the New York Times. I chose 1929 for several reasons. The 
first is that the Great Depression is widely understood as the most significant financial 
crisis to date and being able to empirically explain the dramatic fall in prices would 
constitute a significant contribution to the literature. The second is that various metrics 
indicated that borrowing costs were low during the latter half of 1929 when the market 
crashed. For example, traditional margin requirements were low during this period, 
becoming as low as 10%.2 Broker loan volume was high at a time when money rates were 
low on October 3rd where the rate dropped to 6% from 7.5% the day before.3 Furthermore, 
a large fraction (around 40%) of stocks were being bought on margin.4 Thirdly, margin 
requirements were not regulated by the Fed like they are today. Instead, brokers controlled 
these loans and set the price according to their own interests which likely contributed to 
the low interest rate associated with borrowing. Brokers profit as the number of loans they 
give out increases.  
Factors explaining the low barrier to trading on credit is important for this topic 
because the call loan rate is a short term interest rate which was the principal rate brokers 
borrowed at. This low rate quantified the ease with which shares on margin could be 
                                                          
1 Randy Frederick, Charles Schwab, February 08, 2018: This percentage generally differs by broker. 
Modern margin agreements allow for borrowing up to 50% of the purchase price of marginable securities.  
2 1929: The Great Crash, a BBC documentary, October 29, 2009 
3 Financial times, October 4, 1929 
4 Entangled Political Economy: Roger Koppl, Steven Horowitz, Page 142, October 3, 2014 
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purchased for brokers’ clients.  Finally, 1929 is useful because there is ample variation in 
the call loan rate which is valuable for econometric analyses.  
I collected daily stock return data from Ken French’s website in addition to returns 
on Fama and French (1993)’s SMB and HML factors used to explain variation in returns. 
I also collected returns data on 12 industries. To avoid the problems mentioned by Hsieh 
and Miller (1990) and others regarding Hardouvelis (1988, 1990)’s measure of volatility, 
I used an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity one lag model [ARCH (1)] to 
determine daily volatility. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) showed that there is a negative 
relationship between volatility and stock prices. This occurs because as stock prices fall, 
the firm becomes more levered due to an inherent adjustment in the percentage of debt in 
a firm’s capital structure.5 Leverage makes cash flows riskier to equity holders which raises 
the required return on equity (ROE) and volatility of stock returns. An alternate explanation 
for Black (1976)’s finding is that high market volatility means that stocks are relatively 
risky when compared to other riskless instruments like treasury bills and hence demand a 
higher risk premium. This implies that upward movements in volatility (assuming that 
volatility is expected to remain high for some time) would lead to lower stock prices and 
hence negative returns. For these reasons, I expected the coefficient on volatility to be 
negative and statistically significant for the regression specifications which I ran and which 
are explained in more detail later in this paper.  
I ran six different regression specifications in order to determine the effect of a 
change in the call loan rate on stock returns. I began by regressing daily returns from 1929 
                                                          
5 In company financial statements, Debt is denoted in book value, whereas references to capital structure 
generally assume book value of debt and market value of equity.  
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on the percentage change in call loan rates. I then included daily volatility as an additional 
explanatory variable. I also regressed industry excess returns on excess market returns and 
the change in the call loan rate. I then added in volatility as an explanatory variable. My 
final two specifications mimic the 3rd and 4th specifications except that they include the 
Fama-French SMB and HML factors. 
I found a statistically significant negative relationship between the change in call 
loan rates and total stock market returns during 1929. The coefficient on calldiffpct in the 
first specification is -1.653 and the coefficient changes to -1.609 upon the introduction of 
volatility into the regression. Volatility has a statistically significant coefficient of -0.614. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation move of 0.18% in the call loan rate difference in 
percentage results in 0.299% drop in stock returns. When including market volatility as an 
explanatory variable, I found that a one standard deviation change in call loan rates results 
in a 0.291% drop in stock returns. A one standard deviation move in the change in volatility 
as a percentage of roughly 0.6% reduces daily stock returns by 0.37%.  
After looking at the broader market, I looked at the effect of the change in call loan 
rates on 12 different industries in order to understand whether this effect is different across 
industries. I found that in each industry specification, the only industry with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient is manufacturing with a coefficient ranging from -0.362 
to -0.450 depending on the specification. A one standard deviation move of 0.18% in the 
call loan rate with a coefficient of -0.362 when including the market, volatility, and the 
Fama-French factors results in a 0.065% reduction in daily returns for the manufacturing 
industry. A one standard deviation change in the volatility of manufacturing returns of 
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0.6% and a coefficient on volatility of 0.253 increases daily returns by 0.15%. Besides the 
consistency of manufacturing in providing statistically significant results, the lack of 
significance of call loan rates and volatility on other industry returns might imply that the 
effects of the call loan rate were quite similar across industries, further suggesting that 
perhaps stocks in most industries were purchased on margin to roughly the same extent.  
For the rest of the paper, I analyze prior literature on the subject and commented on 
what contribution this paper makes to the current literature. The literature highlights an 
important trend in the view of how important borrowing restrictions are to understanding 
stock returns. I continue the discussion by describing how I run my empirical tests by 
outlining the data used and how the regressions were constructed. I then explain my results 
and conclude by discussing these results and their relevance for future research.  
2. Literature Review  
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve the authority to 
set the minimum margin requirement for brokers, dealers, and lenders at the time of 
purchase.6 This meant that the margin requirements were no longer market determined and 
subsequently saw an increase from their 1929 levels. 
 The crash of 1929 is of particular interest because of the lack of empirical studies 
done on the effect of changes in call loan rates on daily stock returns. White (1990) 
discussed the causes of the Great Depression and cited a plethora of reasons behind the 
crash including Galbraith (1954)’s mania hypothesis, the new economy and the stock 
                                                          
6 SEC.gov – SEC Act of 1934  
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market of the 1920s, the role of fundamentals in the bull market of the 1920s, and credit 
and the stock market boom. Galbraith (1954)’s conventional wisdom focused on the 
irrationality behind the bubble. He argued that it was a feeling of jubilation among the 
general public and a view that positive returns would be perpetual which drove up prices.  
Both Galbraith (1954) and Kindleberger (1978) hypothesized that the stock market 
was intrinsically unstable and any one of the factors above could have led to the collapse 
of public confidence. Fisher (1930) argued that the Smoot Hawley tariff meaningfully 
contributed to the 1929 demise. Yet White (1990) showed that there is no empirical 
evidence behind the tariff argument by comparing export reliant indices and import reliant 
ones. He showed that stocks in these two indices declined by similar amounts after the 
tariff passed. Finally, Fisher (1930) posited that the failure of Clarence Hatry’s financial 
empire in September of 1929 represented the first main shock to the London stock market 
which rippled over to the U.S. soon after.  
Among the many reasons behind the crash lies the credit and stock market boom 
hypothesis. Kindleberger (1978) argued that easy credit in the stock market played a large 
role in creating the mania that led to the bubble and the inevitable bust. Figure 1 shows the 
growth in loaned funds made by brokers charted against the broad stock market index from 
1926 - 1931. It is clear that brokers’ loans peaked right before the 1929 crash. 
White (1990) pointed out that the easy credit argument during this time period is 
contradicted by tight monetary policy in the latter half of the 1920s. For example, the Fed 
implemented contractionary policy in January of 1928 when it increased the discount rate 
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from 3.5 to 5%.7 Hamilton (1987) argued that this constituted tight money and points out 
that M1 grew insignificantly in 1929 and the CPI (consumer price index) fell.  
The Federal Reserve understood that easy credit gave investors the ability to force 
security prices up and create instability through speculation. In order to minimize the effect 
of this, the Federal Reserve Board wanted to prevent member banks from making loans on 
marginable securities to brokers who eventually made them to consumers. They did this by 
threatening to close the discount window for member banks if those banks continued to 
make these loans. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York disagreed with this policy 
measure and reaffirmed the inability of the Fed to deny discounted assets for member 
banks. Instead, it proposed raising the discount rate as the only means of curbing 
speculation. However, a conflict in policy between the Board and the New York Fed 
prevented rates from rising.  
White, Kindleberger, and Fisher all pointed out that easy stock market credit was a 
key driver in creating the mania that contributed to the market’s downfall. However, White 
(1990) suggested that it is difficult to test for a bubble due to the lack of daily data and 
improper previous specifications by other authors. This study aims to properly test White 
(1990) and others’ primary hypothesis that it was easy stock market credit that led to the 
demise in October of 1929 by using call loan rates as a proxy for the cheap borrowing costs 
that enabled credit-driven speculation. It is apparent that the literature on the subject lacks 
an empirical study of the changes in daily call loan rates in 1929 and their effect on stock 
returns. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to conduct this analysis by not only 
                                                          
7 Federal Reserve History: Stock Market Crash of 1929  
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estimating the effect on stock returns to see if these changes in interest rates were a 
meaningful factor in the crash, but also to estimate the effect of volatility on returns.  
In addition to the literature discussed above introducing the topic and the necessity 
for it, there is an abundance of previous literature on the topic which mostly deals with the 
effect of margin requirements on volatility. In a seminal paper, Hardouvelis (1990) started 
by reasoning that the reason the Federal Reserve put into place margin requirements was 
because it believed that the stock market crash of 1929 was due to credit-financed 
speculation. As such, reducing the ability to buy on credit should reduce volatility and bring 
stock returns to their true values. Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) found that stock values were 
closer to their fundamental values in times when margin requirements were high or were 
increased than when they were lower or lowered.   
Figure 3 shows the relationship between margin requirements and market volatility. 
The graph shows that there is some correlation between higher official margin 
requirements and S&P composite volatility. Hardouvelis (1990) performed three tests, one 
using a monthly measure of volatility, the other a daily, and a Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) Analysis. He found that higher margin requirements are linked with future reduced 
stock return volatility, stock returns, increased trading volume on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), and reduced borrowing for stock purchases. Hardouvelis (1990) also 
found the same results in non-turbulent periods (1934 and onwards).  
 Hardouvelis (1990)’s reduced form evidence from vector autoregressions showed 
that while there is a negative relationship between margin requirements and volatility, this 
does not imply a causation. Furthermore, the opposite relationship implying that volatility 
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is a driver in changing margin requirements is not empirically supported. This is the crux 
of Schwert (1988b)’s paper which contended that the observed negative relationship 
between margin requirements and volatility is reflected by the idea that increases  in margin 
requirements seem to come after periods when stock volatility is low and vice-versa. This 
policy might occur because of the observed relationship that Black (1976) pointed out: 
when stock prices are high, volatility is typically low. The Fed assumes that high prices are 
driven by speculation and thus curbing speculation will reduce stock prices to normal levels 
which brings along higher volatility. Schwert (1988b) concluded that this finding is even 
more relevant after observing that stock returns behave no differently from normal 
following a year after the change in margin requirement was implemented. Thus, the 
conclusion is that the Federal Reserve responds to market conditions and that these actions 
have no effect on subsequent stock returns.  
Hardouvelis (1990) disputed Schwert (1988b) and (Schwert 1989) by pointing out 
that the inclusion of two very important control variables, the monthly real rate of return 
of stocks and the growth in the ratio of margin credit to the value of the NYSE, to the 
general margin requirement - volatility regression leads to the opposite findings of Schwert 
(1989). Specifically, that there is no relationship between changes in volatility and margin 
requirement policies but that margin requirement policies do in fact reduce volatility of 
returns.  
Hardouvelis (1989)’s explanation for Schwert (1988b and 1989)’s results is that 
because high stock returns negatively affect volatility and positively affect margin 
requirements, the negative volatility - margin requirement relationship is actually due to 
16 
 
high stock returns triggering higher margin requirements, not low volatility triggering 
higher margin requirements and vice versa. I run the opposite test which looks at how 
volatility effects margin requirements. In short, according to Hardouvelis (1989), low 
volatility does not drive high margin requirements as Schwert (1989) suggested, but rather 
the observed negative correlation is actually due to increased stock returns triggering 
higher margin requirements as a means to bring prices down to their fair values which will 
increase volatility since prices are lower. Hardouvelis concluded by empirically testing the 
effects of increased margin requirements on excess volatility and found that excess 
volatility is higher during periods of low margin requirements. This finding held for post-
depression periods as well.  
Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) contributed to the literature by investigating 
whether the negative relationship between margin requirements and volatility exists in 
Japan on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The reason this analysis is important is that 
empirical research in the U.S is constrained due to margin requirements only changing 22 
times between 1934 when the SEC gave the Fed the power to change margin requirements 
and 1992 when Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) was written. The Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) is particularly useful for this sort of analysis because the exchange has changed the 
margin requirement over 100 times since Japanese margin regulation was put into place in 
1951.8 
The authors focus on establishing a 24 day investment period for their empirical 
analysis of the relationship between margin requirements and stock returns. They run a 
                                                          
8 Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book (1989) 
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regression of returns over the 24 day period on the change in margin requirement preceding 
this 24 day period. The authors found a statistically significant negative coefficient on the 
margin rate change variable. The TSE breaks stocks into two sections. This result was 
found for the first section. In order to determine some measure of causality, the authors 
performed this analysis on the Second Section of the TSE. The stocks in this Second 
Section are not allowed to be bought on margin. As such, a causal relationship would imply 
a stronger effect of margin requirements on marginable securities in the First Section as 
opposed to the non-marginable ones in the Second. 
 Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) found that while the growth of stock prices in 
the Second Section of the TSE is negatively related to the change in margin requirements, 
the correlation between the two variables is materially weaker, implying a stronger 
foothold for the negative stock price-margin requirement hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
authors rejected the null that both coefficients on margin requirements between Section 
One and Section Two are the same, implying that the returns reaction to margin 
requirements are most definitely different when comparing the two indices. The authors 
solidified this result by performing the same analysis on a daily frequency, instead a weekly 
one as done in the prior section. Figure 4 by Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) shows the 
immediate growth in stock prices of the First Section and a far weaker and negative reaction 
to the Second Section.   
 Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) also tested what relationship margin 
requirements have on volatility. They found that when a control variable for stock returns 
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is included in the regression, the negative relationship between margin requirements and 
volatility becomes statistically significant and material.  
The next paper which established strong precedent to ignore the findings of 
Hardouvelis (1988, 1990) was Hsieh and Miller (1990). The authors started by contending 
that curtailing volatility might not be a good thing because volatility represents the faster 
incorporation of new information in market prices of securities. They also pointed out that 
from 1974 to 1990, the Fed had not changed margin requirements because of the view that 
the impact of these requirements is miniscule.  
Specifically, during 1929 and the peak of the boom, total stock market credit did 
not exceed more than 10% of the market value of traded equities and by 1974, the number 
dropped to 2%.9 Hsieh and Miller (1990) tested for the negative relationship between 
margin requirements and volatility by looking at the 22 historical changes in the 
requirement and the effects of volatility following these changes. They looked at both short 
term and long term effects of a policy decision to raise or dampen requirements.  
For the short term, the authors looked at whether standard deviation changes from 
what it was 25 days before the margin requirement change to 25 days after the change. 
They found very few statistically significant changes in the short term. Specifically, out of 
the 22 changes in the requirement, only 1 of them showed a statistically significant increase 
in volatility as margin requirements were decreased which is what we would expect in this 
sort of specification. The other 2 significant occasions showed that volatility declined when 
                                                          
9 Brady Commission Report, Appendix VIII, esp. p. VIII-2 
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margin requirements declined, a finding that proves counterintuitive to the initial negative 
requirement - volatility hypothesis.  
In the long term, the authors used monthly real returns of the S&P 500 rather than 
daily returns and the associated standard deviations. They found that across the 22 changes 
in margin requirements tested, there is a weakly negative relationship between standard 
deviations and margin requirements but that the Levene statistics do not materially and 
significantly differ between high margin periods and low margin periods.10 In explaining 
their results, which are contradictory to Hardouvelis (1990), Hsieh and Miller (1990) 
argued that Hardouvelis (1990)’s negative correlation finding is incorrect because of the 
technical specifications of his model. More specifically. Hardouvelis used the wrong proxy 
for stock market volatility, implemented an incorrect specification for the time series 
relationship between margin requirements and volatility, and erroneously set up his 
multiple regression as it relates to the macroeconomic variables included.  
Kupiec (1989)’s analysis of initial margin requirements and stock return volatility 
also set the precedent for further criticism of Hardouvelis (1988, 1990)’s work. Kupiec’s 
main contribution was the usage of a more appropriate measure of volatility. He used a 
GARCH in Mean model to estimate daily volatility. Kupiec argued that Hardouvelis’ 
simple measure of a 12 month moving standard deviation is incorrect because it created a 
misleading correlation between the variables of interest and did not account for the excess 
kurtosis of stock returns as well as the time dependent conditional variances of auto 
correlated and moving average components. Furthermore, a GARCH model accounts for 
                                                          
10 Levene Howard (1960)’s “Levene Statistic” is an inferential statistic used to test the statistical difference 
between population variances of two or more groups 
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an equilibrium model of asset returns by relating non diversifiable risk to conditional 
expected excess of the risk free rate returns.  
The primary advantage of the GARCH as it relates to the estimate of volatility is 
its ability to deal with the non-stationarity of the moments of a distribution. In this case, 
the relevant 2nd moment, variance as manifested by volatility, moves around and is high in 
the late 1920s. The results of the GARCH specification show that there exists no 
statistically significant relationship between margin requirements and excess return 
volatility. These findings are consistent with Schwert (1988). The other important finding 
is that the GARCH in Mean specification that Kupiec (1989) ran yielded a 20% less volatile 
(as measured by standard deviation) data series than the one obtained by Hardouvelis 
(1988a, 1998b) which used a 12 month moving standard deviation estimate. This result 
comes from the ability of the GARCH to account for short term spikes and drops in 
volatility that are exhibited in Hardouvelis’ measure of volatility. In my study, I did not try 
and find a relationship between margin requirements and volatility. Instead, I used 
volatility as an explanatory variable to explain variation in stock returns. The test that 
Kupiec (1989) ran to find a relationship between margin requirements and volatility might 
also be useful in a separate paper given the use of an ARCH model in this paper to estimate 
volatility.  
Finally, Hardouvelis and Theodossious (2002) looked at the effect of margin 
requirements on volatility in a bull market versus a bear market. Although their result that 
margin requirements should be increased in bull markets to reduce speculative excess and 
increased in bear markets to provide liquidity is valuable, the relevance of their paper is to 
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defend the findings of Hardouvelis (1990). Hardouvelis (1990) received criticism from 
Kupiec (1989), Schwert (1989), Salinger (1989), and Hsieh and Miller (1990) for his 
incorrect regression specification discussed in Granter-Newbold (1974) regarding the bias 
in the use of levels and an erroneous measure of monthly volatility. Hardouvelis (2002) 
started by claiming that the papers only dispute the monthly measure examined in 
Hardouvelis (1990), not the daily or VAR estimate. Secondly, Hardouvelis (2002) 
attempted to close the discussion about levels versus differences by showing that the use 
of levels for margin requirements and not differences is justified because margin 
requirements and volatility are stationary and thus the specification used to describe the 
relationship between the two variables does not provide biased results. While this piece of 
literature isn’t directly relevant to the topic of this paper which principally investigates the 
effect of the change in call loan rates on stock returns, not volatility, this paper is important 
because it tried to end the debate on the relationship between frequently discussed variables 
of interest. 
Overall, the literature gives mixed findings. The main takeaways are that in the 
beginning of the study of the topic, the main contributions to the literature were from 
Hardouvelis who empirically showed a negative margin requirement volatility relationship. 
Papers after Hardouvelis improved upon his methodology and argued that the regression 
specifications implemented were flawed and the results differ upon correction of this 
misspecification.  
What is more noteworthy and the subject of the paper going forward is that none of 
the literature performed any empirical analysis of the interest rate associated with 
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borrowing. Instead, the literature focused on the actual margin requirement itself which as 
mentioned before, is simply a percentage which indicates how much you can have in cash 
and how much you can borrow to finance your position in a security. In 1929, the margin 
requirements and the call loan rates were market determined. These call loan rates are 
borrowing costs and while there isn’t a definite downward trend in 1929 for call loan rates, 
call loan rates were generally much lower in the second half of 1929 during the buildup to 
the bubble and the subsequent crash.  
The purpose of this paper as mentioned before is to determine what impact, if any, 
these low borrowing costs had on the run up of prices and subsequent crash of 1929 when 
accounting for daily volatility. The following sections outline the collection of data, the 
specification itself, and the results of an empirical analysis missing in the existing literature.     
3. Data 
The difficulty in this analysis lies in the relative scarcity of the data required to 
perform an empirical analysis. This is one possible explanation reason for why previous 
studies have not conducted this analysis. With the exception of Fohlin (2017), there is no 
literature documenting the daily call loan rates in 1929. As such, I used the historical 
New York Times (NYT) in the ProQuest database to manually collect daily call loan 
rates in 1929. The last close was used for empirical purposes although ProQuest has 
information on data from the year prior as well as the day prior. I then filtered out 
weekends and holidays. In addition, because some NYT excerpts are incompletely 
scanned, missing values in the data were replaced by linear interpolations of the 
preceding and subsequent data points.  
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After collecting this information, I collected daily total stock returns, SMB and 
HML Fama-French factor returns, and data on the risk free rate during 1929. I filtered out 
the trading days on Saturday to align the data with the call loan. During this time, stock 
markets traded on Saturday but call loan rates were not. In addition to total stock market 
data, I also collected data on 12 industries. Industries include non-durables, durables, 
manufacturing, energy, chemicals, business equipment, telecommunications, utilities, 
shops, healthcare, money and other. They act as a portfolio of different securities within 
these twelve categories.  
The data used in my model comes both from the Ken French website and the 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
4. Empirical Analysis 
The goal of this paper is to determine whether the change in call loan rates affects 
stock returns. Specifically, did the relatively low cost of borrowing prop up the market 
and create a bubble which was inevitably going to burst? What about volatility? Do we 
find a negative relationship between volatility and stock prices? Do increases in call loan 
rates quell high stock returns when accounting for volatility? How does this result vary 
across industries? These are the questions that I aim to answer by running regressions on 
the market in addition to 12 industries to determine what effect a change in call loan rates 
has on stock returns.  
The primary result is how call loan rates affect the total stock market. I used the 
mktrf variable which denotes the total daily stock market return less the daily risk free 
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return. On the right hand side of the regression is alpha, the percentage change in daily 
call loan rates, and percentage change in daily volatility.  
Arriving at a precise measure of volatility was important to avoid the criticism 
discussed above that Kupiec (1989) made of Hardouvelis’s (1988) paper which used a 12 
month moving average of standard deviation of returns. Volatility is a statistical measure 
of security price fluctuations within a given time period and is represented as the square 
of the daily return series.  The daily volatility is the measure of fluctuations within a day 
and is calculated as the one period lag difference squared of a return series.  
Overview of the GARCH and ARCH 
Engle (1982) developed the ARCH model while Bollerslev (1986) created the 
GARCH model. Both argued that these models were designed to deal with the 
assumption of non-stationarity in financial data. Miah and Rahman (2016) highlight that 
ARCH and GARCH models have become important tools for dealing with time series 
heteroscedasticity by treating heteroscedasticity as a variance to be modelled. The goal of 
such models is to provide a volatility measure like a standard deviation that does not 
remain constant and that can be used in financial decisions.  
Aktan, Korsakienė, and Smaliukiene (2011) pointed out that the magnitude of the 
estimated parameters α and β describes the short-run characteristics of the resulting 
volatility time series. Large GARCH lag coefficients (β) indicate that volatility is 
persistent because shocks to conditional variance take a long time to die out. Large 
GARCH error coefficients (α) indicate that volatility reacts strongly to market 
movements, and if (α) is relatively high and (β) is relatively low, volatilities spike 
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frequently in the period of interest. To get a benchmark for what is large, Alexander 
(2001) shows that in financial markets it is common to estimate (β) lag coefficients based 
on daily observations in excess of 0.8 and (α) error coefficients of no more than 0.2.  
 I use the ARCH lagged by 1 day which was derived by Engle (1982). I did not 
use Bollerslev (1986) GARCH model due to the inability for the GARCH to fit market 
data for 1929. The GARCH specification is outlined below. The ARCH ignores the last 
term of the GARCH specification which uses previous period volatility as an input for 
future volatility forecasts.  
(1)                              𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 =  𝜔𝜔 +  ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖2𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗2𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1  
Miah and Rahman (2016) described the above specification and terms as the 
following: 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 is the conditional variance of returns, 𝜔𝜔, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 are coefficients that 
need to be estimated through this specification, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖2  is the residual lagged returns by 
whatever specification is chosen. 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗2  is the lagged variance. Miah and Rahman (2016) 
explained that a primary challenge in financial modelling is to find the right model from a 
family of models that best fits the data. The most common criteria in determining 
whether a candidate model is too simple or unnecessarily complex are the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
AIC: T x ln(residual sum of squares – (RSS)) + 2n 
                                BIC: T x ln(RSS) + nln(T) 
T is the number of observations and n is an estimated parameter. In an analysis of 4 
Bangladeshi companies, Miah and Rahman (2016) found that a (1,1) specification of the 
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GARCH(p,q) is the best fit for their data. Optimally, an AIK and BIC analysis would be 
done for the market data. However, given the inability for the GARCH to fit the model in 
addition to an ARCH (1) yielding statistically significant coefficients for 1929, an ARCH 
(1) was used to forecast volatility. The ARCH specification is therefore just the GARCH 
minus the last term. The ARCH model yields a variance. As such, the square root is taken 
to arrive at standard deviation. Then the value from the previous day is subtracted from 
today’s value to obtain a difference which then is expressed as a percentage. This final 
variable form is used for the regression.  
In addition to call loan rates and volatility, the SMB and HML factors from Fama 
and French (1993) were included. Eugene Fama and Ken French developed a model to 
describe and explain variation in stock returns. They found that there are three main 
factors which are able to explain roughly 90% of diversified portfolio returns. The first 
factor is the market returns, the second is “SMB” or small-minus-big. This refers to the 
observed outperformance of smaller company stocks over bigger stocks. The third main 
factor is “HML” or the outperformance of companies with high book to market values 
over those that have lower book to market values. This model is an expansion of the 
traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which uses only market risk to describe 
returns and describes about 70% of the returns variation. Building upon the CAPM, Fama 
and French arrived at the following specification:  
(2)                 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 +  𝜀𝜀 
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The Fama-French specification is relevant for this paper because it provides a 
baseline of important variables to include to explain variation. The final two regression 
specifications run on the market are below: 
(3)  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) +  𝜀𝜀 
(4)  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐) +  𝜀𝜀 
In addition, the regression specifications for each industry are adapted by changing the 
left hand to the relevant industry less the risk free rate but retaining the market measure 
of volatility. The industry specific regressions are below:  
(5)  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) +  𝜀𝜀 
(6)  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 �𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖� +  𝜀𝜀 
(7)  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) +  𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 +  𝜀𝜀 
(8)  𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝑖𝑖 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥  (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) +
𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥 (𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐) +   𝛽𝛽3 𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽4 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 +  𝜀𝜀 
After establishing the regression specification, STATA was used to carry out the analysis. 
Data was created in a CSV and imported into STATA. The results are discussed below. 
5. Results 
Table 1 highlights the major results from this study. The first two regressions (3), 
(4) which are the main results of this paper look at the change in call loan rates on excess 
market returns in 1929. The second version of this regression includes the measure of 
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volatility. I found that the coefficient on calldiffpct, the variable which describes the daily 
percentage change on call loan rates, to be -1.653 without the inclusion of volatility and   
-1.609 upon the introduction of volatility into the regression. All three coefficients are 
statistically significant with the two coefficients on the call loan rate being significant at 
the 5% level while the one on volatility at the 1% level. Therefore, a one standard 
deviation move in the call loan rate of 0.18% implies a 0.30% drop in daily stock returns. 
After including volatility, this drop in stock returns becomes 0.29%. This shows that a 
part of the drop in stock returns in attributable to volatility but not much. A one standard 
deviation change in daily volatility of 0.60% reduces daily stock returns by 0.37%. This 
confirms Black (1976)’s finding that volatility and stock returns are inversely related. 
The adjusted R2 is low at 1.4% without volatility and 3.9% with volatility. Although this 
is not technically a margin requirement in the traditional sense, the call loan rate implies a 
constraint on borrowing which when increased, reduces stock market returns.  
The next specification run (5) was excess industry returns on excess market 
returns and the call loan rate variable. I found that the only industry with a significant 
coefficient was manufacturing with a value of -0.449 with significance at the 5% level. A 
one standard deviation move of 0.18% in call loan rates implies a 0.08% move in daily 
manufacturing returns. After including volatility in the specification (6), manufacturing is 
the only industry that remains statistically significant and negative when observing the 
effect of call loan rates on returns. Manufacturing, business equipment, shops, health, 
money and other all had statistically significant coefficients on the volatility variable. 
Shops, health, money, and other all had negative coefficients on volatility while 
manufacturing and business equipment had positive relationships with volatility.  
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 Regression specification (7) looks at the effect on excess industry returns from the 
excess market returns, call loan rates, and SMB and HML. Upon the inclusion of the 
Fama-French factors, manufacturing returns and call loan rates exhibited a negative 
association while call loan rates and health exhibited a positive relationship. Both 
relationships were statistically significant with a coefficient on call loan rates for 
manufacturing of -0.400 and 0.889 for health.  This implies that a one standard deviation 
move in call loan rates implies a reduction in daily manufacturing stock returns of 
0.072% and a 0.16% increase in daily health stock returns.   
 Finally, in regression specification (8), I looked at the effect of excess market 
returns, call loan rates, volatility, SMB, and HML on industry stock returns. I found that 
manufacturing has a -0.362 coefficient on the call loan rate variable and a 0.253 
coefficient on the volatility variable. The call loan rate was statistically significant at the 
5% level and the volatility at the 1% level. Money also had a statistically significant 
result on volatility with a coefficient of -0.229 at the 5% level.  
In order to understand why these results might persist both on the returns and 
volatility side, a potential approach might look at trading volumes on margin for specific 
industries to see if these industries that had statistically significant results were also 
industries that had high margin trading volume. This might lead to a better understanding 
of which industries are more sensitive to higher interest rates.  
Furthermore, it is reasonable to have found that not all industries exhibit a 
negative relationship between call loan rates and stock returns or volatility and stock 
returns. Average cumulative alpha of all industries must sum to roughly 1 since those 
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industries make up the total market. Thus, some industries are bound to do better than 
others and worse than others. In addition, their sensitivity to call loan rates varies based 
on the proportion of trades placed on margin for that industry. This explanation extends 
to volatility in that on average, the market falls with increases in volatility, but some 
industries fall less than others and this result changes depending on what time horizon is 
observed.  
What is noteworthy is that results for industries show that manufacturing tends to 
be consistently sensitive to changes in margin requirements which would imply that 
manufacturing stocks might be bought more on margin than chemicals for example. 
Overall, the main result of interest falls in line with the hypothesis that increases in call 
loan rates reduce stock returns in 1929 when controlling for the relevant variables.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
White (1990) aptly pointed out the real possibility that low call loan rates could 
have been responsible for the Great Depression and crash that is so frequently written 
about. However, before and after White’s paper, others in the literature have focused 
mainly on the effect of a margin requirement on stock returns and volatility. Hardouvelis 
initially posited that margin requirements are reactionary measures which the Fed uses to 
curtail volatility and temper inflated stock returns. However, authors after him such as 
Hsieh and Miller (1990) pointed out the flaws in his test design and showed that margin 
requirement changes follow changes in stock prices rather than lead them. They also 
showed that there is no statistically significant change in stock prices when the Federal 
Reserve changes the margin requirement.  
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While the existing literature is important for the impact of holding little cash to 
finance a large position, it does not speak to the impact of having a low cost of borrowing. 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate this issue, specifically in 1929 when the call 
loan rate was not set by the Federal Reserve. This has interesting implications because the 
rate was significantly lower during this time partially because it was market determined. 
What impact did this have on overall returns? According to the empirical analysis presented 
in this paper, the low rates contributed meaningfully to the inflated prices that eventually 
resulted in the October crash. This is accounting for volatility which is also shown to be 
negatively correlated with returns.  
However, this result did not hold for most industries. Does this mean that one can 
avoid the negative impacts of a potential change in call loan rates by just investing in 
specific industries? Perhaps. But in 1929, this was tough considering the large drop in the 
entire stock market. What does this trend say about potential trading strategies, a future 
topic to be investigated in relation to this paper? One could conceivably create options on 
potential reactions in the market to changes in call loan rates by going long on industries 
that are less affected by call loan rates and go short the ones that are more affected 
(manufacturing, healthcare, or even the entire market). Or in a more general sense, can one 
make bets about how the market will do if they for see a change in Federal Reserve policy 
on the horizon? According to previous papers on this subject, none of these anomalies 
should exist when looking at a strict change in margin requirements. But it is unclear what 
happens in regards to changes in the call loan rate.  
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A completely separate paper replicating the studies of previous papers which 
looked at the 23 changes in margin requirements since the Fed was given that ability until 
the time of the paper being published could be replicated for large changes in call loan 
rates. Furthermore, this study could be replicated for different periods to see if the result 
still persists. This result as of now is specific to just 1929 because of the unique nature of 
how the rate was set, how low it was relative to today, and the obvious crash in October. 
This study could be a valuable tool in driving Federal Reserve policy for the future and 
shape the way that investors think about trading on margin.  
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7. Appendix 
Figure 1: Stock Prices and Broker Loans from 1926 – 193111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Figure taken from White (1990) paper. Data not readily available for chart recreation.  
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Figure 2: Interest Rates from 1926 – 1931 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Figure taken from White (1990) paper. Data not readily available for chart recreation. 
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Figure 3: Official Margin Requirements vs. S&P Composite Volatility 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Graph taken from Hardouvelis (1990). Data not readily available for recreation.  
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Figure 4: Margin Decrease vs. Stock Price Reaction 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Taken from Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992). Data not readily available for graph reconstruction.  
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Figure 5: Call Loan Rates in 1929 
 
Table 2: Call Loan Rate Changes on Market and Industry Returns 
Following econometric specifications (2) through (7), in this Table I show primarily the estimated effects of the change in daily call loan rates in percent on market excess returns. I control for market 
excess returns, daily volatility as measured by an ARCH (1), the Fama-French SMB and HMl factors for explaining returns, and alpha. Security market data was hand collected at a daily frequency from 
Ken French’s website and CRSP. Security returns are value weighted historical returns of all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ for which complete data exists. Daily call loan rate data 
was found in the historical New York Times on the ProQuest database from January 1929 - December 1929. An ARCH (1) model was estimated using daily returns on excess market returns in 1929 and 
used to calculate daily volatility. Columns 1 and 2 indicate excess market returns as the dependent variable, while columns 2-49 are excess industry returns used for the six specifications mentioned 
earlier in the paper. The independent variables are listed on the left hand horizontal axis. Excess market returns are only used as a control in industry specific regressions. P-values: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
Variable: Mkt-Rf Mkt-Rf 
Non-Durables 
- Rf Durables - Rf 
Manufacturing 
- Rf Energy - Rf Chemicals - Rf 
Business 
Equipment - Rf 
Market - Rf 
 
 0.756*** 1.191*** 0.961*** 0.826*** 1.313*** 1.383*** 
 
 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.015) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
 
-1.654** -1.610** -0.092 0.222 -0.450** -0.197 0.378 -0.411 
 (0.759) (0.749) (0.177) (0.426) (0.178) (0.346) (0.343) (0.366) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
 
 -0.614***       
  (0.226)       
SMB         
         
HML         
         
Alpha -0.059 0.001 -0.017 -0.148 .0195 -0.006 0.131 0.172** 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.031) (0.076) (0.032) (0.062) (0.061)** (0.065) 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.039 0.915 0.822 0.946 0.773 0.896 0.894 
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  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dependent 
Variable: Telecom - Rf Utilities - Rf Shops - Rf Health - Rf Money - Rf Other - Rf 
Non-Durables - 
Rf Durables - Rf 
Market - Rf 0.866*** 1.268*** 0.952*** 0.843*** 1.366*** 0.651*** 0.751*** 1.190*** 
 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.168) (.014) (0.036) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
0.043 0.286 0.008 0.548 0.432 -0.094 -0.092 0.222 
 (0.401) (0.344) (0.271) (0.393) (0.314) (0.203) (0.176) (0.426) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
      0.104 0.053 
       (0.053) (0.129) 
SMB         
         
HML         
         
Alpha 0.094 0.163*** -0.125** -0.016 -0.010 0.0175 -0.007 -0.153** 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.049) (0.071) (0.056) (0.0364) (0.032) (0.077) 
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.889 0.880 0.729 0.918 0.860 0.916 0.821 
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 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (21) (22) (23) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Manufacturing 
- Rf Energy - Rf Chemicals - Rf 
Business 
Equipment - Rf Telecom - Rf Utilities - Rf Shops - Rf Health - Rf 
Market - Rf 0.971*** 0.825*** 1.310*** 1.395*** 0.875*** 1.274*** 0.942*** 0.819*** 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.022) (0.031) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
-0.448*** -0.197 0.377 0.412 0.434 0.286 0.006 0.544 
 (0.172) (0.346) (0.344) (0.363) (0.399) (0.343) (0.267) (0.379) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
0.213*** 0.001 -0.063 0.252** 0.195* 0.115 -0.216 -0.508*** 
 (0.052) (0.105) (0.104) (0.110) (0.121) (0.104) (0.081) (0.115) 
SMB         
         
HML         
         
Constant -0.001 -0.006 0.137 0.147** 0.075 0.152** -0.104 0.032 
 (0.031) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.0726) (0.062) (0.048) (0.068) 
Adjusted R2 0.737 0.772 0.895 0.895 0.734 0.889 0.884 0.751 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
  (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) 
Dependent 
Variable: Money - Rf Other - Rf 
Non-Durables 
- Rf Durables - Rf 
Manufacturing 
- Rf Energy - Rf Chemicals - Rf 
Business 
Equipment - Rf 
Market - Rf 1.349*** 0.645*** .7839*** 1.091*** .982*** .965*** 1.222*** 1.215*** 
 
(0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.048) (0.020) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
0.430 -0.095 -.002 -0.030 -0.400** 0.136 0.155 -0.018 
 (0.306) (0.201) (0.166) (0.426) (0.181) (0.336) (0.344) (0.341) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
-0.338*** -0.129**       
 (0.092) (0.061)       
SMB   0.225*** -0.238 0.007 0.152** -0.140** -0.427*** 
   (0.034) (0.087) (0.037) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) 
HML   -0.050 -0.301*** 0.103* 0.579*** -0.345*** -0.491*** 
   (0.059) (0.151) (0.064) (0.119) (0.122) (0.121) 
Constant 0.021 0.029 0.018 -0.182** 0.019 .010 0.113* 0.110 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.029) (0.076) (0.032) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) 
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.862 0.928 0.828 0.946 0.794 0.899 0.911 
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  (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
Dependent 
Variable: Telecom - Rf Utilities - Rf Shops - Rf Health - Rf Money - Rf Other - Rf 
Non-Durables - 
Rf Durables - Rf 
Market - Rf 0.728*** 1.151*** 1.002*** 0.959*** 1.374*** 0.754*** 0.786*** 1.082*** 
 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.027) (0.959) (0.035) (0.021) (0.019) (0.050) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
0.047 0.007 0.171 0.889** 0.481* 0.162 0.000 -0.043 
 (0.358) (0.339) (0.238) (0.356) (0.307) (0.163) (0.166) (0.427) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
      0.021 -0.089 
       (0.053) (0.136) 
SMB -0.636*** -0.128* 0.437*** 0.601*** 0.261*** 0.201*** 0.230*** -0.261** 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.048) (0.072) (0.062) (0.038) (0.036) (0.094) 
HML -0.158 -0.483*** -0.118 0.077 -0.179* 0.352*** -0.049 -0.305** 
 (0.127) (0.120) (0.084) (0.126) (0.109) (0.067) (0.059) (0.152) 
Constant -0.004 0.148** -0.054 0.077 0.032 0.045  0.017 0.177** 
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.042) (0.063) (0.055) (0.033) (0.029) (0.076) 
Adjusted R2 0.794 0.896 0.910 0.786 0.924 0.883 0.928 0.828 
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  (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Manufacturing 
- Rf Energy - Rf Chemicals - Rf 
Business 
Equipment - Rf Telecom - Rf Utilities - Rf Shops - Rf Health - Rf 
Market - Rf 1.007*** 0.975*** 1.206*** 1.217*** 0.710*** 1.157*** 1.005*** 0.938*** 
 
(0.020) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.028) (0.042) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
-0.361** 0.151 0.130 -0.015 0.021 0.015 0.174 0.847** 
 (0.174) (0.336) (0.344) (0.342) (0.358) (0.340) (0.239) (0.354) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
0.252*** 0.098 -0.162 0.023 -0.174 0.052 0.023 -0.211* 
 (0.055) (0.107) (0.110) (0.109) (0.114) (0.109) (0.076) (0.113) 
SMB 0.072* 0.178** -0.181 -0.421*** -0.680*** -0.115 0.443 0.547*** 
 (0.038) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.052) (0.078) 
HML 0.114* 0.583*** -0.352 -0.490*** -0.166 -0.481*** -0.117 0.068 
 (0.062) (0.119) (0.122) (0.121) (0.127) (0.121) (0.085) (0.126) 
Constant 0.005 -0 .005 0.122 0.108* 0.005  0.145** -0.056 0.089 
 (0.031) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.043) (0.063) 
Adjusted R2 0.950 0.793 0.900 0.910 0.795 0.896 0.910 0.788 
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  (48) (49) 
Dependent 
Variable: Money - Rf Other - Rf 
Market - Rf 1.351*** 0.752*** 
 
(0.036) (0.022) 
Call Loan Rate 
Difference in 
% 
0.446 0.158 
 (0.305) (0.189) 
Volatility 
Difference in 
% 
-0.229** -0.023 
 (0.097) (0.060) 
SMB 0.202*** 0.195*** 
 (0.067) (0.041) 
HML -0.189* 0.351*** 
 (0.108) (0.067) 
Constant 0.045 0.046 
 (0.054) (0.034) 
Adjusted R2 0.925 0.882 
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